

Rebalancing US Military Power

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ABSTRACT: For all the attention paid to partnering, too little goes into what “partnering” might mean from ostensible partners’ points of view. In the 21st century, sensitivities and sensibilities matter. So do economic realities. The US military should make better strategic use of military advisors to help foreign security services professionalize—something the United States can only do if foreign militaries are willing to engage in civic action themselves.

In the wake of resurgent terrorism, withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget cuts, defense intellectuals and members of the military alike increasingly discuss the need to shape, partner, and advise foreign forces.¹ Or, as LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Faris write, “America’s land forces should look to develop a global landpower network. This network would consist of allies, expeditionary global and regional partners, and host-nation forces.”² The goal? To secure US national interests indirectly, inexpensively, and without putting large numbers of “boots on the ground.”

White House, too, underscores security sector assistance. Its aim is to:

- Help partner nations build the sustainable capacity to address common security challenges.
- Promote partner support for US interests.
- Promote universal values.
- Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations.³

However, there are at least four flaws in our collective approach.

First, its prescriptions are all about “us” and US-centric needs, thereby taking for granted others’ needs. Second, the list reflects little understanding of what “partnering” might mean to America’s ostensible partners—in fact, it reveals just the opposite. Third, it suggests the United States will continue to pursue the same old strategies that have already served it so poorly. Finally, it diverts the United States from what should be its main goal abroad: other countries’ development of their own incorruptible, apolitical security services—a goal that is an either-or (it can or cannot be done) proposition, and not something, as many suppose, that takes decades to achieve.

1 See Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), for an excellent overview of the promises and pitfalls of stability operations, and debates from various US perspectives.

2 LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Faris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” *Army*, July 2013, 23.

3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*, April 5, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>

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Because some interagency “stakeholders” object to the word “professionalize”—in their view it is demeaning and insulting to suggest other forces are not already professional—in this article, the term “professional” refers to incorruptible, apolitical security services.⁴ The argument is that when security services are incorruptible, states hold together. India is an example. Few countries contain more sectarian divides, or have had to wrestle with a greater variety of insurgency. Yet, India’s armed forces have remained apolitical and professional. This is not just a legacy of British imperialism, since other South Asian countries were woven from the same cloth. Rather, India remains a vibrant pluralist democracy thanks to, among other things, the armed forces’ commitment to behaving apolitically and according to meritocratic principles.⁵

In contrast, regimes in many countries are not just corrupt, but rulers send members of the security services to do their coercing and compelling for them. Unfortunately, all it takes is the collusion of some high-ranking members of the army, police, gendarmerie, or other security services for leaders to engage in venal behavior. Or, to put none too fine a point on it, whenever people in uniform do politicians’ personal bidding and act as their willing muscle, they subvert the state. On the other hand, when members of the security services *refuse* to engage in intimidation or coercion on behalf of politicians, and refuse to behave like thugs, those in power find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to compel people against their will.

Security services that protect rather than undermine the state’s integrity are not just vital to a country’s stability, but apolitical, incorruptible armed forces are also essential to protecting those other two institutions that help guarantee responsible, responsive governance: the judiciary and the media. In fact, try to build any institution of state without first securing the integrity of the armed forces and you will only end up pouring good money after bad—something the United States has been doing abroad for decades.⁶

Meanwhile, professionalization is a straightforward proposition. It does not require a whole-of-government approach—at least not by Americans. It is neither complicated nor costly, although it also is not always possible, to achieve. To gauge whether it is possible requires, first, advisors of the right stature and mindset. Second, general officers in Washington and at the combatant commands have to be willing to take advisors’ assessments seriously and convey them truthfully to policymakers.

Americans make a mistake whenever we underestimate the political acuity of non-Western allies and adversaries.⁷ Today, most non-Westerners in positions of authority are more familiar with us than we are with them, a late 20th century inversion that holds profound implications for

4 There is now a vast literature discussing professions and professionalism. See Jessica Groves, Lily McGovern, and Tim Baker, comps., *Military Professionalism: An Annotated Bibliography on the Nature and Ethos of the Military Profession* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security, Ethics, and Leadership (INSEL), National Defense University Library, December 2010). <http://www.usafa.edu/superintendent/diversityoffice/links/MilitaryProfessionalismBibliography.pdf>

5 Of course, the fact that Pakistan and China both loom as real threats has also contributed.

6 For more on the effects of aid, see Anna Simons, Joe McGraw, and Duane Lauchengco, “Chapter 7” in *The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

7 For the full argument, see Anna Simons, *21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them* (FPRI e-book, 2012). https://www.fpri.org/docs/Simons_21st_Century_Cultures_of_War.pdf

advising and partnering in the 21st century.⁸ Indeed, those who think a 10- or 20,000 person advisory corps, or partnering as we conceive it, are suitable counters to terrorism or insurgency display little more their own unsophistication about the non-West. Forget, too, T. E. Lawrence as a role model—his methods remain shrouded in controversy. What stability and security require instead is working by, with, and through professionalized security services.

Advising

Consider the history of successful military advising—with success defined as both parties getting what they need out of the relationship—and it should quickly become apparent that mass-producing advisory skills is a contradiction in terms.⁹ Interpersonal chemistry matters. So do attributes like humor, patience, wile, and the ability to influence without manipulation. There is no evidence that any of these are trainable skills, or that such traits are as common as most proponents of advising missions seem to think. Instead, their combination is rather rare.

The history of successful military advising shows a distinct arc, one that coincides better with the shift in who understands what about whom. This arc is perhaps best described using the default lens of familial relations. Parent-child, sibling, and spousal relations can be considered default relations not only because they are the relations most familiar to most people, but because they also comprise the basic bio-grammar for how we humans interact.¹⁰

In parent-child relations, parents dominate and typically command respect. As children age, authority may chafe and youth might eventually rebel, but fealty should endure.

When it comes to siblings, older brothers and sisters are in a position of literal (if not figurative) dominance, at least initially. As younger siblings mature, they often attempt to escape their elders' thumb or shadow, and what had been respect can turn to resentment. Over time, younger siblings usually expect to be treated as equals, though they never will be equals from their elders' perspective.

Meanwhile, in healthy marriages, spouses are co-equals despite, if not because of, their differences. Couples share a division of labor (even if unevenly), and though one spouse will doubtless be better at certain things, and will likely dominate in certain areas, in stable marriages neither individual will be judged as superior in all things.

8 This is a literal truism if one just considers the number of heads of state who speak English and at least one other language vs. their American counterparts.

9 Not even everyone in the US Army Special Forces (SF) is suited to be a military advisor, though SF selection comes closer than any other to screening individuals with advisor-like skills. I write this based on extensive discussions over the past 15 years in my Military Advisor class, as well as field observations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, I need to be clear: a 10,000-person corps might well be capable of *training* foreign forces. But training is to a standard, and is far easier for young marines, soldiers, and others to accomplish than is advising, which requires context-dependent judgment.

10 I am borrowing and stretching Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox's notion of bio-grammar from *The Imperial Animal* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971). Or, as Edward Schein notes, "As Freud pointed out long ago, one of the models we bring to any new group situation is our own model of family, the group in which we spent most of our early life," *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd ed. (New York: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 124.

Advisory relationships often bear a resemblance to one, two, or arc across all three, of those categories, and can morph or evolve (and even devolve) over time. For instance, American advisors in the jungles of World War II actually led more often than they advised, but by Vietnam they commanded less and worked with the “indig” more. In contrast, few populations today are unfamiliar with Western influences. Advisees tend to expect reciprocity at a minimum.

Two obvious points are worth drawing here. First, both parties in a relationship will not necessarily view it similarly. And expectations will differ cross-culturally. For instance, while marriages in the West tend to be marriages of choice, officers from Jordan and Pakistan have pointed out how similar advisory relations are to *arranged* marriages; most advisors and advisees have no choice about who they are partnered with and have to learn how to accommodate one another if they want the partnership to work.¹¹

Thanks to the culturally specific ways humans have been raised to treat those who remind them of parents, siblings, or spouses, there is a strong likelihood that counterparts without deep cross-cultural familiarity will misread one another, to include misreading one another’s misreadings.¹² Alternatively, too much time spent together can pose different problems. For instance, sometimes when people know each other too well they bridle at not receiving the respect they feel they deserve. Two examples would be former allies in Eritrea and Ethiopia or Uganda and Rwanda. Over the course of long liberation struggles, leaders and insurgents in both sets of countries developed sibling-like dependencies, with Eritrea’s Isaias Afewerki relying on but also helping to build Meles Zenawi’s insurgent forces and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni relying on and helping to incubate Fred Rwigyema’s and Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Years later, both ended up in bitter wars with one another.

While it seems only human that dependence should degenerate into outright hostility on occasion, the real source of the problem with asymmetry is superiority.¹³ It may be impossible for individuals in an advisory role not to regard themselves as superior to those they are advising. Not only does the very fact of having something to impart mean one operates from a position of strength (if not authority), but the more one has to offer and the more deference one receives, the more special treatment one expects.

Another facet of inherent inequality is that treating titular counterparts as equals is easy when they are liked and admired. It feels more hypocritical and corrosive when they are not. But under either

11 In the wake of Saudi Arabia’s October 2013 rejection of a UN Security Council seat, consider: “Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal is fond of saying that the US and Saudi Arabia no longer have a Catholic marriage, but rather a Muslim one. This is a clever way of saying that Saudi Arabia and the US are not faithful to each other. In the absence of any major-power alternative to the US, for the Saudis in this Muslim marriage, the US may well remain Wife No. 1. Even if she is not about to be divorced, however, the Saudis are clearly declaring a trial separation.” See Karen Elliott House, “Behind the Saudi-U.S. Breakup,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 25, 2013.

12 Some Americans might insist that talking in terms of family metaphors is ridiculous; the more useful foil is friendship. They would probably suggest this because, in their view, they always try to treat others as friends. Yet, in doing so they may also fool themselves since their advisees are unlikely to share their understanding of friendship, especially since friendship means something quite different, (and counts for less than family) in many non-Western settings.

13 One actually sees this among social animals across the board, not just among humans.

circumstance it can be grossly irresponsible to treat people who are not as good as they think they are as though they are as good as they believe, since this can set them—and others—up for failure later. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann fell into this trap in Vietnam.¹⁴ He purposely strengthened the reputation of his counterpart, Colonel Huynh Van Cao. By publicly crediting Cao for operations he (Vann) planned, Vann made it impossible to later point out, even to his own chain of command, that Cao was not as effective as advertised. After sounding optimistic about the war for months, Vann never could get higher-ranking officials to heed his reassessment of the conflict. Of course, cynics might contend that Vann's approach is simply emblematic of what happens whenever wars are subjectively recounted.

Looking ahead, it will not just be rhetorical excess that plagues reporting (and analysis). Among the challenges confronting members of the US military is to assess how best to work with forces whose sensibilities about their capabilities may well outstrip their actual abilities, but who are also hyper-sensitive to any slights. This brings us to the term “partner.” Tellingly, few in Washington have spent sufficient time examining what the word “partner” might mean from current or likely future partners' points of view. Washington has not made clear what partnership *should* mean to foreign governments, or to US servicemembers or taxpayers.¹⁵

Partnering

Here, then, is one formulation: to succeed, a partnership should be grounded in mutual indispensability. Anything less creates a dependency, and a dependency is by definition not a partnership.

Partnerships can come in a variety of forms:

- In *Partnership Type #1*: you are my equal. We are interchangeable, and our forces can be fully blended.
- In *Partnership Type #2*: I trust you implicitly. We can agree on a division of labor. I will be responsible for Sectors A, B, and C; you will be responsible for Sectors D, E, and F.
- In *Partnership Type #3*: we are complementary and operate in tandem. You have skills and capabilities I lack, and vice versa. I will defer to you for intelligence and local knowledge; you can rely on me for logistics and medevac.

Historically-speaking, the United States has been involved in all three types of arrangements; one can find each exemplified somewhere during World War II. Yet, if one asks how many such arrangements the United States is involved in today, the honest answer would have to be that most of its associations are with expedient dependents.

14 Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage, 1988).

15 Yet, as COL Alan Shumate notes, “building partner capacity is a critical component of our future National Security Strategy. These three words appear twenty-five times in the January 2012 Department of Defense publication, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” Alan Shumate, “Building Partner Capacity in the 21st Century: How the U.S. Can Succeed,” *Small Wars Journal*, August 7, 2013.

Nor will Washington's prescription that the US military promote partner support for US interests successfully redress this situation. Just the opposite. Not only does prioritizing American interests put the cart before the horse, it ignores what is needed to keep others' interests and US interests aligned for as long as possible, which has always been the hallmark of successful advising (not to mention partnering). Tackling local needs should always come first.¹⁶

The reason is simple: as a military becomes more capable of addressing its security concerns, it builds its capabilities to address Washington's concerns—although, ideally, once local forces become sufficiently professional bad actors should no longer operate in (or from) that country.¹⁷ Of course, professionalization also means members of security services must be paid a decent wage, receive better than decent conditions of service, earn a decent retirement, etc. Tellingly, if fair pay and benefits are not something senior leaders are already striving to secure for their forces, then that is an indicator in and of itself that the security services' culture is awry, and professionalism does not exist.

The inescapable reality, again, is that securing security requires nationally capable—apolitical, incorruptible—armed forces. Stability is undermined by anything less. So is honest partnership.

Civic Action—The Ultimate Indirect Approach

One problem with the United States' current approach is that Washington's motivations for working with others are proximate: counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counterdrugs, counter-you-name-it. US forces concentrate on improving local security forces' abilities to shoot, move, and communicate, while also admonishing them to not violate human rights. Washington might hope that these efforts will have additive effects over time, but the truth is nothing the United States does will guarantee stability in someone else's country. That task belongs to them, while the challenge for the United States should be to determine whether its putative counterparts have what it takes before Washington starts investing, rather than after the United States is embroiled.

As for how policymakers might make this determination, consider civic action. It is the ideal canary in the coal mine. Countries that can keep civic action alive are countries with which the US military can work. Countries that cannot, or will not do so, are either beyond US help or not ready for it.

16 Here is one of the kinds of things that can happen when local needs are not met: apparently the US did not realize or did not take seriously the fact that the Malian government's chief concern was separatists, not AQIM. The separatists' ability to operate then created the space *for* AQIM to move in—and Mali's current plight and spillover effects throughout the region are one consequence: "Over time we began to realize that the ATT government was focused not on AQIM as a threat but rather on Tuaregs in the north," a senior defense official at the Pentagon told me. "He saw a political threat and a security threat but not the kind of counter-terrorism threat that we were focused on. I think that kind of mismatch is part of what was starting to unravel the partnership on [counterterrorism] when the coup happened." Yochi Dreazen, "The New Terrorist Training Ground," *The Atlantic*, October 2013, 66.

17 What I am suggesting is the obverse of the campaign to get Joseph Kony. The Lord's Resistance Army is not a pressing security concern for any of the African governments involved. Rather, it is of keen interest to certain lobbying groups in the US. That makes it the wrong mission to use for helping depoliticize and uncorrupt regional forces since it is a mission that is more important to President Obama than to local heads of state or their militaries.

This assertion is based on a two-part comparison. First, there is civic action as conceived by Edward Lansdale, advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, Minister of Defense and then President of the Philippines in the 1950s. Second, is the comparison one can make between Lansdale's approach with what is done today.

Lansdale credits himself with introducing the concept of civic action to Americans during the Huk Rebellion, one of the few 20th century insurgencies the United States succeeded in helping to counter.¹⁸ According to Lansdale's and Magsaysay's definition, civic action consists of those things a national military can (and should) do to protect rather than prey on its citizens.

In Lansdale's and Magsaysay's view, members of the Philippines armed forces needed to prove themselves to be of, for, and by the people—which meant uniformed personnel had to stop extorting people or accepting bribes. They also had to stop allowing politicians to corrupt them. At the same time, to prove their trustworthiness, there were certain things those in uniform could assist with, such as policing the national elections in 1951. By doing so, soldiers did not just demonstrate their commitment to protect the integrity of the political system, but safeguarded a free and fair vote. Indeed, many say the Philippines has not had as free or fair an election since Magsaysay was tragically killed in a plane accident in 1957.

Two other things noteworthy about Lansdale's advisory approach were that he had very few Americans working with him, and he disbursed very little money. He never bought support. When he did dispense money, it was for doing clever things against the opposition. A third critical factor was, of course, Magsaysay.¹⁹ Magsaysay was a man of the people. He was also a compelling leader. One example: he loved making surprise visits not only to catch slackards off-guard, but to force the entire military to stay on its toes and self-police, all of which helped (re)instill pride.

In short, both men's version of civic action consisted of the Philippine military proving to citizens its worth as their national (emphasis on the word "national") military. What civic action consisted of and who conducted it was totally Filipino-centric.

Now, compare this to what the United States touts and promotes today. Because Washington likes combining soft approaches and surgical strikes, it engages in development assistance. Yet, no matter how good it makes Americans in uniform feel to build a well here, a clinic there, or a school somewhere else, that kind of unilateral civic action by the United States adds up to nothing coherent in terms of strengthening the social contract or the delivery of goods and services by another government to its people. To be sure, school-building, clinic-construction,

18 William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), suggests that William Howard Taft deserves credit for civic action: "unconsciously or at least without attribution, Lansdale took Magsaysay back to the 'civic action' policy of William Howard Taft" (51). For Lansdale's activities, see his own account: Edward Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991).

19 Magsaysay was also noticed because there were Americans who were paying attention. Paying attention and helping create conditions in which talent has a chance to draw attention early are exactly what IMET money and JCET should be doing.

and well-digging can be important local force protection measures. Whenever a base is put somewhere, those inhabiting it should want people in the neighborhood to think well of them, especially since local residents represent both their first and last local line of defense; the easiest way to get local residents to think well of them is for those outsiders to do things for the locals.²⁰ Americans in uniform, however, should not fool themselves. Any such actions they undertake do nothing to improve the capabilities or image of local forces.

Alternatively, where the United States does not maintain a permanent presence, its forces typically support sustainable development instead, a type of assistance that has been fashionable in aid circles for quite some time. Yet, projects that do not require periodic American assistance make little sense for a different reason: after all, if the US government's overarching aim is to guarantee access and placement to counter everything from drugs to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, then surely projects that require periodic maintenance, spare parts, technical readjustments, and so on would be more prudent than "fire-and-forget" assistance. One can imagine that if only the military were to treat development projects the way it orchestrates foreign military sales, it would engineer projects specifically designed to need ongoing maintenance, parts, and/or re-fittings—and ideally, maintenance, parts, and/or re-fittings that cannot be reverse engineered or offered by anyone else. Or that, at any rate, is what looking at US strategic interests through a US-centric lens suggests. Flip this lens around, however, and one has to wonder what non-Western government in the 21st century would want, let alone allow, the United States to retain this kind of dependence-inducing leverage over it?

In other words, both approaches are fraught with difficulty. Drive-by well-digging and related practices are of fleeting value other than to help line some locals' pockets, while anything the United States does that is more substantial gets the local government and security forces off the hook of having to provide for and look out for their citizens themselves. Such activities also give the lie to US rhetoric about respecting other countries' sovereignty, since if only Washington took that more seriously, American officials would make it clear to foreign governments that it is their sovereign duty (and not America's job) to develop their countries themselves, using the means at their disposal and not American taxpayer largesse. In fact, Americans contributing anything that can be pocketed, stolen, or skimmed does nothing but undermine sovereignty, and acts as a solvent that both undoes and corrupts local security services.

Any assistance apart from military-to-military training, professional military education, or military exchanges, runs counter to what is needed to secure America's security, which is that other countries secure theirs. As for why militaries and not civilian agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should be the lead agent for Lansdalian-style civic action, there are at least three reasons.

1. The greatest need for building mutual trust and confidence between a government and its citizens typically occurs where insecurity has

20 According to population-centric warfare, improving people's lives helps to keep them from succumbing to others' outreach and propaganda. But at least some of what US forces engage in may amount to moral blackmail—but it does (as this author observed in Afghanistan in 2011).

already been rampant or where there is a history of mistrusting those in uniform.

2. Militaries are designed to operate in austere environments and usually possess greater logistical reach than anyone else; even inept militaries have more equipment and can marshal more manpower than other institutions of state.
3. Militaries are the most nationalist institutions there are, and usually draw from all sectors and segments of society; if they do not they should. This makes them bellwethers, which means they also offer the fastest way for a government to prove to its citizens (and concerned others) that it has turned over a new leaf.

As for why the United States should want to use military-to-military training to support professionalization: this plays to US strengths. Again, too, as Lansdale's and Magsaysay's success makes clear, civic action and professionalization cost very little. Civic action is achieved through local sweat equity, thus it aligns well with 21st century economic realities. Even better, once Washington makes a country's ability to demonstrate a real civic action orientation the new requirement for receiving security sector assistance, that assistance would no longer have to be substantive, since here would be a government and a military that would already be working toward being self-sustaining, which is the hallmark of professionalism. A country's ability to do its own civic action would also signal it has a military and government the United States can meaningfully partner with and a political economy Americans and others can safely invest in.

Getting from "Advisor" to "Partner"

By adopting the approach that others need to do their own heavy lifting (while the United States technically assists), Washington would not only free the US military from performing all sorts of aid-like functions but also liberate itself from seeming to preach one thing (equality) while doing something else (infantilizing others). As it is, when the United States helps construct anything—except a civic action capability in another country's military—it creates nothing but new dependencies, which have a sharper edge of resentment than those the Cold War once had.

At the same time, impelling other governments to develop their own civic action capabilities would not just arrest the corruption the United States inevitably funds whenever the Department of Defense undertakes or supports development projects abroad, but there is no better nonkinetic way to compel those in power to remain responsive to their citizens, thus mitigating the grievances that feed rebellion and insurgency.

In this sense, civic action represents a critical capability and litmus test rolled into one. Does the country Washington is considering as a partner already possess a civic action capability? If so, good. If not, is it willing to develop one? Again, governments that do not want their militaries to develop a civic action capability are governments the United States cannot effectively help—nor should it want to.

One of the few silver linings to the past decade's worth of involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is that most US policymakers appear to

agree that partnering with a government that shows no interest in its population makes no sense. However, whose responsibility will it be to make this conclusion stick? The obvious answer should be: general officers. Their stars earn flag officers this duty. In addition, no one else is so well positioned to perform (or exert) this responsibility. If advisors determine that a “counterpart” military is not interested, or its government is not interested, in civic action, signaling that professionalization cannot take root, then it should be general officers’ responsibility to let policymakers know that, under current conditions, Country X cannot be stabilized or assisted by the United States. On the one hand, general officers should bear this responsibility thanks to their rank. On the other, subordinates and citizens alike depend on them to not play politics. Consequently, general officers have to be prepared to push back hard if the president (who cannot help but be political) insists, since clearly advisors in the field cannot.

Using civic action as a litmus test, and advisors as assessors, is the most parsimonious—and arguably the only foolproof—way to keep the system honest regarding “partners.” To forge true partnerships and worthwhile strategic networks requires that partner militaries not only be de-politicized and inoculated against corruption, but that those in uniform reorient themselves toward earning their citizens’ trust. Otherwise, it is hard to see how Washington will ever build reliable partnerships to obviate anti-state and nonstate actors that pose transnational threats.²¹

21 For how Washington should interact with states that are not interested in getting rid of transnational threats to the United States, see Anna Simons, Joe McGraw, and Duane Lauchengco, *The Sovereignty Solution*.